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The dramatic upward sweep in food grain production among several
nations in South and Southeast Asia has gripped the attention and the
imagination of statesmen and scholars all over the world. Almost every
economic aspect of this revolution is open for debate and disagreement.
But there is at least one area of general agreement: it $s that the
new agricultural technologies have pushed several less-developedformer
food grain importers to self-sufficiency in the 1960’s and probably will
do the same with other nations well into the 1970’s. This thrust in
productivity is already having important repercussions on the agriculture
and the agricultural policy of the developed, temperate zone nations
1/ which produce and export food grains to world m=kets.-
The international trade aspects of this so-called Green Revolution
bring the interests of developed nations and less-developednations into
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direct clash, at least in the short run. This clash occurs on three
levels. First, rapidly growing food grain output in some less-developed
nations means less opportunity for both commercial and confessional
exports of food grains to these nations by
nations. Second, it means that at least a
may become regular or intermittent sellers
rice markets. This will intensify already
grain-producing developed
few previously deficit nations
on internationalwheat and
stiff competition and downward
price pressures in a shrinking world market already plagued by protec-
tionism and surpluses among its richerparticipants. Third, less-developed
nations which depend heavily on food grain exports will f+ce glutted world
markets and may have to compete intensively for sales with subsidized grain
from wealthy exporters. Thailand, in particular, faces this third problem
with rice.
The major objective of this
of these problems. ,The analysis
paper is to discuss the nature and extent
is complicated by concurrent agricultural
policy developments, also associated with self-sufficiency,now going on
in developed food grain importing nations such as Japan and the member
nations of the European Economic Community.~/
The main focus is on the agricultural problems and policies of the develo-
ped nations as they react to increased grain production in the less-developed
world, especially in South and Southeast Asia. In particular, we argue
,.,
that the agricultural trade and policy problems confronting the wealthier
nations will be intensified, in the short run, by the production successes
of the Green Revolution. Moreover, we suggest that as agricultural policy
problems intensify, especially with food grains, political pressures will3
grow for increased protection for producers in both import and export
nations.
The data suggest that up to now the new seeds
have been most widespread in wheat production with
and new technologies
rice in second place.
(1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 23) Emphasis in this paper is on internationalwheat
markets. Wheat is the food grain most closely related to agricultural
policy problems in the United States, Canada, Australia, and Western
Europe.1/ The rice policy problems in Japan parallel very closely to
the wheat policy problems of the EEC, and both sets of problems are
intensified by mounting wheat and rice self-sufficiencyamong the less-
developed nations.
The future time horizon of our discussion is rather vague. There
are simply too many unknowns to accommodateprecision. Generally speak-
ing, we refer to the period spanning the 1960’s and extending through
the 1970’s. Beyond, say 1980, no one can predict reasonably.
The biological, technical, and economic aspects of the Green
Revolution within the nations moving toward self-sufficiencyreceive
scant attention. This topic is best left in other hands. However, some
comments later in the paper concerning possible future policy moves by
developed nations hinge on assumptions about the nature and direction
of changes in marketing and economic organizationwithin developing
nations. At the moment, it is enough to say that food grain self-
sufficiency is a fact for several nations and is likely to occur very
soon for several others. Let us now briefly assess the status of agri-
cultural problems and policies in the developed world, especially regarding
food grains.4
Agricultural Problems and Policy in Developed Nations
The basic agricultural problems reflected in the food grain
sectors of the United States, Canada, Australia, the European Community,
and, to a large extent, Japan have many similarities. A partial list of
these problems includes:
(1) excess production capacity (or supplies) at current internal
price levels
(2) constant political pressure to maintain or increase farm
incomes
(3) pressure to maintain or expand export outlets (both commercial
and non-commercial) in order to alleviate domestic grain sur-
pluses and to earn foreign exchange.
Attempts to deal with these problems and others, have produced a
series of complex commodity programs for food grains and other agricultural
products. Specific policy objectives and program details naturally differ
4/ Each set of programs is designed to attain the from nation to nation.-






and priorities depend upon the immediacy of particular
political pressures exerted within nations and from
For example, food grain policy goals in the United
States involve supply restraint, farm income protection, export expansion,
and government cost reduction. Both humanitarian and surplus disposal
goals are evident in the establishment and operation of the Public Law 480conccssional export program
flour, and rice have formed
nations.
5
in which food grains, mainly wheat, wheat
the bulk of the shipments
Food grain policy goals in Canada and Australia,
wheat, are broadly similar to one another. (21, 29)
been historic export producers at approximately world
incomes traditionallyhave been reasonably comparable







income to food grain producers from elsewhere in the economy. Both
nations rely importantly on agricultural exports to finance internal
economic growth. Consequently, policy goals stress export expansion
and development. Until recently, shielding producers from wide income
fluctuations caused by weather and external price variation also was a






emerging as major policy goals in both Canada and Australia
food grain surpluses and low prices in world market.
agricultural policy goals for the EEC as specified in the
Rome involve (1) increasing agricultural productivity,
fair standard of living for the rural population, (3) sta-
bilizing markets, (4) assuring regular supplies, and (5) maintaining
reasonable consumer prices. However, during the decade of the Community’s
active life, emphasis has focused on protecting and raising farm income
through market prices and on guaranteeing domestic food supplies by means
of greater self-sufficiency. Priority has been given to production and
marketing goals within the Community. Agricultural trade policy, for6
both imports and exports, has been designed to serve internal price and
production objectives despite vigorous and often bitter protests from
non-member nations.
Apparent policy goals for food grains in Japan currently
those for the EEC rather closely, with rice the staple rather
parallel
than wheat.
(15, 21, 26, 29) Income protection for farmers and rice self-sufficiency
for the country seem to be the major goals. Like the European Community,
Japan recently has emerged as a surplus food grain producer. Also similar
to the EEC, Japanese agricultural policy is now moving toward finding
export outlets for excess food grains and exploring methods of production
restraint.
Policy Tools
The specific programs and mechanisms used by these developed nations
in attempting to cope with their food grain problems naturally differ.
Each of these developed countries is fortunate enough to be able to afford
agricultural programs which, to some extent, transfer income from the non-
farm sector to the farm sector. This transfer may come from consumers via
high prices, from taxpayers via direct payments or export subsidies, or
via some combination of the two. Less-developed nations which face agri-
cultural problems usually cannot afford these income-transfer luxuries.
The principal policy tools employed for food grains may be classified
into seven categories on the basis of their operational details.
(1) price supports or guarantees
(2) direct income payments





discrimination between domestic and export outlets
(7) confessional export or domestic disposal programs
Individual country or commodity programs typically involve the use
of two or more of these tools simultaneously. For example, the availa-
bility of wheat price supports to individual U.S. farmers is contingent
upon their compliance with acreage controls. Export subsidies by the
EEC together with import controls are the Community’s principal means
of executing market discrimination between domestic and export outlets
for wheat.
Some form of price supports or guarantees is common to each of the
developed food grain producers under consideration here. Presently, some
form of production control is being practiced in the United States, Canada,
Australia, and Japan. Until recently, the United States was the only major
exporter to attempt output restraint through administrative mechanisms.
All of these wealthier
controls and subsidize
support wheat for food
suppliers protect domestic markets by means of import
exports either directly or indirectly. All of them
at higher internal prices than wheat for feed.
Domestic marketing is handled
to a large extent, in the European
governmental or quasi-governmental
by private firms in the United States and,
Community but is the responsibility of
boards in Canada, Australia, and Japan.
In Japan, rice is sQld to consumers at lower prices than paid to farmers
(for equivalent quantities). The financial loss is sustained by the Food
Agency of Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry which handles all internal8
marketing. Each of thcscdeveloped nations now operates some form of
confessional export sales or donation program to the less-developed
world. These programs are discussed in a separate section.
Canada. The Canadian Wheat Board guarantees floor prices for a given
quantity of wheat annually based on expected market needs. This floor
price is reflected in an initial payment made to producers by the Board.
Some production control is achieved in two ways. First, delivery quotas
assigned to individual producers restrict the quantities which can be
marketed in given time periods; hence, surplus production is backed up
on farms. Second, beginning in 1970, a program of land diversion payments
and grain delivery quotas linked to acreage diversion into forage and
fallow was begun. Changes are occurring in Canadian grain policy at
this time, but future policy will probably continue to emphasize output
limitation and acreage diversion. (11, 31)
No direct export subsidies are paid, but imports are controlled by
tariffs. Since mid-1969, wheat for domestic food use has been sold by
the Board at prices higher
Australia. The Australian
through a two-price scheme
A IIhomeconsmptionll price
“guaranteed price” applies
than for exports or feed use.
Wheat Board supports prices to producers
generally similar to the Canadian method.
applies to domestic food wheat. A lower
to domestic feed wheat and a fixed quantity
of export wheat. (5, 11, 29, 36) When export and domestic receipts
are lower than needed to sustain the guarantees, funds are drawn from
stabilization reserves secured from wheat export duties and from general9
government funds. No direct production controls are imposed, but beginning
in 1969, production has been discouraged by limited delivery quotas which
force over-quota output to be held on farms or disposed of by illegal means.
Import tariffs are applied to help maintain internal prices.
United States. A two-price scheme together with output restraint in wheat
summarizes the complex United $tates program. Although U.S. grain marketing
and processing is in private hands, higher prices for domestic food wheat
are sustained by a tax paid by processors on each bushel of wheat milled for
domestic use. Feed wheat and export wheat move at prices closely linked to
world levels. Heavy export subsidies for wheat were a prominent feature of
U.S. policy in the 1950’s but now are used only incidentally.
The two-price character of the current programs is also reflected at
the farm level by means of price support payments made on the domestic
share of the national wheat base acreage. These price support payments
are partially financed by the domestic processing tax and partly by direct
government appropriation. Individual eligibility for these payments, for
price support loans, and for other program benefits is contingent upon
participation in voluntary acreage restraint programs tied to production
history. The potential back flow of wheat imports to the higher priced
domestic market is controlled by strict import quotas, in place since the
1930’s.
Rice policy in the United States merits brief mention. AS the Green
Revolution gathers momentum in rice, U.S. policy will become increasingly
more critical and controversial. The United States produces only about10
2-3 percent of the world’s rice, mainly in Arkansas, Louisiana, Texas
and California. However, the nation’s exports average about 30 percent
of world rice trade. This is because only 3-4 percent of global rice





for over half of
supported prices
its production.
of rice are supported by non-recourse loans at levels
than current world prices. Exports are encouraged by
and by P.L. 480
total exports.
is accomplished
allotments and marketing quotas.
confessional shipments which account
(37) Some output restraint at the
by means of historically-basedacreage
The current situation of low world
prices and large supplies of rice in other exporting nations like
Thailand may force the United States into a major revision of its policy.
In the meantime, the Secretary of Agriculture has announced acreage
allotment and price support reductions to the legal minimum under current
legislation for the 1972 crop year. In his August 6, 1971 announcement
he
in
declared it his firm intention
world markets.
The European Community and Japan.
levels, the EEC would undoubtedly
However, very high internal price
output, and effective controls on
to make U.S. rice generally competitive
At almost any relevant world price
be a large net importer of wheat.
supportp, no controls on internal
imports have recently pushed the
51 -ice supports are Community to wheat self-sufficiencyand beyond.-
offered to farmers through the Guarantee Section of the Agricultural
Guidance and Guarantee Funds. (2) Vartable import levies which capture11
the daily difference between c.i.f. world prices and internal target
prices effectively insulate domestic producers from international com-
petition. Export subsidies, which operate much like variable import
levies in reverse, move excess supplies onto world markets when out-
put exceeds internal demand at the guaranteed price targets.
Much the same description fits the current Japanese case with respect
to rice. High internal prices to farmers are protected by controlled
imports and price guarantees provicled by the Food Agency of the Ministry
of Agriculture and Forestry, which also controls marketing. But Japanese
rice policy differs from EEC grain policy in two important ways. First,
the Food Agency sells rice on consumer markets at a loss in order to
keep the retail price of rice lower than otherwise would be true. Second,
as rice self-sufficiencyhas been attained and surpassed in recent years,
production control has been instituted through payments to farmers for
paddy diversion and enterprise diversification. A program of confessional
exports and food aid assistance in rice also has been started based on
large carryover stocks.
World Production and Trade: Wheat
Keeping in mind this summary of food grain policies and programs in
the developed world, let us turn to the emerging situation in the world
wheat market, a market strongly influenced by the Green Revolution. A
detailed statistical analysis of world wheat trade is not attempted here.
An overview of the aggregate situation is given in figure 1 and table 1,!/
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About one-sixth of world wheat production enters international
7/ Variations in production are not reflected trade channels each year._
fully in trade volume fluctuations. Stocks are drawn down or accumulated
and domestic feed utilization varies so that trade volumes remain fairly
stable. This was especially true in the 1950’s and early 1960’s. Purely
commercial sales accounted for two-thirds to three-fourths of total exports
during the 1960’s. The remainder were special transactions such as direct
food aid, barter sales, and long-term credit sales.
Notice the irregular but persistent increase in world wheat pro-
duction, particularly since about 1961/62, figure 1. When compared with
the slow increase and recent fall in world exports, the conclusion of
mounting self-sufficiencyaround the world is virtually inescapable.
Even non-connnercial or confessional exports have remained relatively
stable or dwindled. The pressure of these developments has not been
shared equally around the world. The United States, Canada, Australia,
and the EEC together account for about one-third of the world’s wheat
production but three-fourths or more of recent global exports. Since
less than one-fourth of world wheat movement is from one developed nation
to another, less-developed countries provide important outlets for excess
supplies from developed producers, table 1.
During the past decade, production increased in the EEC, Australia,
and the United States, but not as fast as world output expanded. Some
recently published production indexes by FAO show that cereal output
(excludingrice) increased by about 19 percent during the 1960-70 periQd
in the areas of the world containing most of the developed nations. Iq14
the rest of the world, cereal output expanded by 37 percent. (lo, May 1971)
Thus, the most rapid output expansion occurred among the less-developed
importing nations, placing pressure on world markets. This pressure oc~urs
(1) as former importers reduce their takings of both commercial and con-
fessional grains and these displaced supplies seek alternative outlets,
and (2) as former importers export food grains produced either in excess
of domestic demand or in excess of their domestic market’s ability to
distribute them internally. (6)
Little or no growth in domestic food use for wheat can be expected
among major exporters; population growth only partly offsets declining
per capita consumption associated with generally negative income elasticities.
Some expansion in feed use is possible at low prices, but, in the United
States at least, this adds economic and political pressure to domestic
supply constraints in operation for feed grains.
The 1964-66 international flow of wheat and wheat flour, classified
by the economic status of trading nations, is shown in table 1. (These
patterns are still approximately correct.) The largest single movement
is from developed to less-developedcountries. This is the segment of
the market where most of the pressure caused by self-sufficiency first
appears.
The heavy movement of wheat and flour from developed to centrally
planned nations reflects commercial exports from Canada and Australia
to the People’s Republic of China (MainlandChina) and to the USSR.
Up to now, it has been especially difficult for western observers to
assess trends and developments in Chinese agriculture. In addition,Table 1: International 1
in percent of
15
Trade Flows for Wheat and Wheat Flour, 1964-66;
total.
Importer







0 3.5 1.0 4.5
2.3 4.1 3.3 9.7
TOTAL 26.0 34.3 39.7 ~oooo~,
“’(57,412thousand metric tons)
DVD = Developed nations5/
CP = Centrally planned (communist)nations31/
LDC = Less-developed nations~/
@ See text footnote ~/.
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture16
internationalcommercial dealings of centrally planned nations are often
unpredictable even when economic information is relatively good. Never-
theless, it is safe to assume that the technological forces driving other
Asian nations toward food grain self-sufficiencyare now at work or soon
will be on the huge Chinese mainland. This would further impede food
grain exports from developed nations.
The Developed Nations
The individual country charts each tell a separate story. Among
the most interesting is the Canadian experience, figure 2. Aside from
the significant variability in production, notice the massive drop in
acreage and output in 1970-71. A stringent acreage diversion program,
known as “Operation L~T”, was responsible for this 50 percent slash in
8/ meat exports appear to have fallen to a output in a single season.-.
level consistent with the experience of the early 1960’s, before the
severe world grain shortages which developed in the middle 1960’s.
A somewhat similar picture is reflected in the Australian chart,
figure 3. The recent policy changes occasioned by mounting inventories,
also requited in an unprecedented cut in acreage. The production response
also was large but generally similar in magnitude to the weather-induced
fluctuations in output in the 1964-68 period, Prior to the acreage cut
at the end of the 1960’s, Australian wheat growers had expanded wheat
acreage more than farmers in the other major wheat exporting nations.
The story differs a bit in the United States, figure 4. The changes
in wheat acreage and output in recent
the substantial decreases in the late
years are not unprecedented, although
1960’s reflect tightened acreage17
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controls and lower market prices. Observe the overall importance and
recent shrinkage in food aid shipments under U.S. government programs,
mainly P.L, 480.
Isolated from world prices, EEC grain
inside the community. The fall in acreage
period, figure 5, reflects internal policy
farmers respond to circumstances
and production in the 1969-71
changes. Policy makers in the
European Community are aware (1) that the EEC achieved and then surpassed
overall self-sufficiency
and weak prices, and (2)
high internal prices and
quently, internal prices
in wheat just prior to a period of world surpluses
that exporting wheat via export subsidies between
low world prices is expensive business. Cons&-
and price differentials on various food and f+ed
grains have been adjusted to favor the production of feed grains and internal
feeding of wheat to livestock. (2, 19, 31)
Confessional Exports
Several developed countries provide non-commercial exports to less-
developed nations in order to advance their humanitarian and foreign policy
goals as well as to provide therewith access to special markets. These
exports involve sales for non-convertible currencies, long term credit
sales, gifts and donations, barter exchanges, bilateral arrangements, ,
and government-to-governmentagreements. Since the mid 1950’s, special
transactions of this variety account for roughly one-fourth to one-third
of total wheat exports annually.
Among wheat exporters, the United States has engaged most heavily,
in food aid sales and donations. Since 1954, when Public Law 480 was21
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first passed, one-half to three-fourths of U.S. wheat exports have been
special transactions, mostly sales for foreign non-convertible currency,
long term credit sales, and gifts. Canada began food aid exports in the
early 1960’s, the annual amount reaching 10 percent of total Canadian
shipments in 1966/67.
Food aid commitments were made in 1968 by several other nations under
the Food Aid Convention of the InternationalGrains Agreement. (10 April 1971)
The initial goal was 4.5 million metric tons annually. The goal was reduced
to 4.0 million tons when the new Intpr~ationalWheat Agreement was negotiated
in 1971. This goal iS about 15-20 percent of actual annual imports by the
less-developednations during the 1960’s. Commitments maY be met with
wheat, rice, other acceptable grains~ or cash. ‘l%enegotiated shares are:
United States, 48 percent; the European Community, 26 percent; Canada,
12 percent; Japan and Australia, 6 percent each. The rema~ning 2 percent
is divided among several other nations. Actual food aid shipments in
1968-69 were approximately 12 million metric tons, substantially exceeding
the goal.
Large consistent food aid shipments, especially foreign currency
sales, to nations like India} Pakistan, and Turkey will be among the
first casualties of the Green Revolution and food grain self-sufficiency
made pcwsible by the Green Revolution.
Prices
It can be argued with substantial logic
some other commodity prices on world ~rkets
that the level of wheat and
reflects, to a large degree,23
the net impact of the protectionist trade policies of importers and
exporters played off agains$ each other. However, period-to-period
variation in world market prices does reflect shifts in the excess
demand and supply functions of individual nations. These shifts am
caused by changes’in underlying economic relationships and/cm agri-
cultural and trade policies. Annual time series of world export unit
values for wheat, qorn, and rice, figure 6, illustrate shifting relation-
ships among these grains. Nptice that the drop in wheat unit values in
recent years has occurred tn the presence of (1) falling export volumes,
and (2) fairly strong world prices for feed grains and~ in the 1967-69
period, rice.~/ Since price is a major connecting link between various
food grain markets and between food grains and feed grains, this weakness
in internationalwheat prices is clearly a symptom of narrowing markets
and growing supplies.
Although internationalprice comparisons are always risky, the
following tabulation suggests the extent of protection for several food
grain producers in a recent year, The Canadian price can be viewed as
an approximation to the world price. The average world exp~rt unit value
was approximately $6$ pqr metric ton. Compare this with the wheat prices
offered to EEC and Japanese farmers (farm prices for rice in Japan are
similarly high). Also notice the middle range of protection offered
u.s. wheat farmers via price support loans and the domestic marketing
certificate payments mentioned
the United States was the only
policy.
earlier. In this particular year, 1967/68,
nation controlling production by direct24
FIGURE 6. WORLD AVERAGE EXPORT UNIT VALUES FoR RICE, wH~A~, AND coRN
























Country $ per metric ton)
Canada (final realized farm price,
No. 1 Northern) 61.60
Australia (average return to grower, f.a.q.) 61.90
United States (average farm price rec’d,
includes direct payments) 68.70
EEC (weightedaverage producer price) 93.70
Japan (producerprice> fixed by gov’t
including bags) 145,50
Summary
This review of wheat production, trade, and policy situation has
emphasized the following major points:
(1) Canada, Australia, and the United States, the main wheat
exporters, depend upon foreign markets for one-half to three-
fourths of their annual wheat production.
(2) The European Community, considered as a single entity,
shifted from a net import to a growing net export position
in the 1960’s.
(3) None of the major exporters can rely on major expansion in
domestic food markets for wheat.
(4) Each of the major exporters has excess capacity locked into





This excess capacity is held as stocks
appears in world markets as subsidized
cessional exports.
or idled land or
commercial and con-
Large world supplies relative to demand have resulted in
weak prices on open internationalmarkets. Much of the
recent increase in world production has come from less-
developed nations.
The developed producers of food grains, for the near future
at least, are committed to farm price and income guarantees
based on multiple price mechanisms and/or direct payments to
growers for land diversion away from food grains.
Costs of sustaining these price and farm income support
programs will grow for both developed and less-developed
producing nations as total grain output grows.
The Green Revolution and Internal Markets
Grain markets within nations experiencing
dramatically affected by increasing volumes of
and rice.
the Green Revolution are
domestically produced whe~t
Policy goals adopted by less-developednations with access to the
technologies of the Green Revolution emphasize self-sufficiency in food
grains and market stability. For example, India’s Fourth Five-Year





safeguard against fluctuations in agricultural production,
reduce dependency on foreign aid.27
Similar agricultural policy objectives are reflected explicitly or
implicitly by governments all across Asia. To the extent that these
goals are achieved or approached, grain markets within less-developed
10/ One could argue nations will be subjected to unprecedented stress.—
that, over many years, complex and often sophisticatedmarketing systems
have evolved to facilitate (1) the handling and distribution of grain in
relatively small lots, and (2) the movement of grain imports into consump-
t ion. The Green Revolution poses an opposite set of problems: namely the
handling and distribution of larger and increasing volumes as well as the
potential movement of domestic grain into export as well as into channels
normally served by imports.
A rough analogy might be drawn between traditional grain markets and
traditional irrigation installations in many parts of Asia. The major’
objective of traditional irrigation works seems to be to spread scarce
water thinly and evenly among the maximum number of users so as to avoid
a widespread crop failure. When large volumes of well-controlled irrigation




to be highly unsatisfactory. Similarly, traditional grain
to spread the limited market surplus into consumption in
a broad market area so as to avoid widespread famine in
poor crop years. Consequently, one can expect traditional grain markets
to face difficulty when called upon to handle, finance, store, and process
large and increasing volumes of grain on a regular basis.~/
Less-developed nations, as they struggle to sustain and accelerate
economic growth, have adopted a variety of price support and incentive
programs to encourage farmers to produce and market increased quantities28
of food grains. As long as an individual nation displays a net deficit
in grains, such a policy can be pursued rather easily. The costs, measured
perhaps as the difference between internal and world prices, can be passed
on to consumers. Confessional imports may be negotiated to cover the
deficit. Then scarce foreign exchange can be reserved for other uses.
Quotas, tariffs, or other barriers can control the import of lower price
commercial supplies. Direct government costs are, therefore, minimal.
When, however, the net deficit is erased through output expansion
at supported prices, the incidence of program costs begins to shift. To
protect its own program the government must meet direct costs of storage
or must operate consumer subsidies to handle the excess supplies internally.
Or it must provide export subsidies in some form to handle all or part of
the surplus externally. Confessional imports become redundant. This
shifting of costs occurs even when self-sufficiency is surpassed erratically.
Governments which are not financially or administratively strong may find
it very difficult to cope with self-sufficiencyand price support commit-
ments simultaneously. These nations face
between the realities of small treasuries
istrativemachinery, on one hand, and the
and development on the other.
a cruel dilemma: they are torn
and already over-burdened admin-
promise of agricultural prosperity
It is not the purpose of this paper to provide a thorough analysis
of the impact of the high yielding grains upon markets within less-developed
nations. However, a series of highly stylized observations will serve to
illustrate the sequence of events
and will characterize traditional
Green Revolution.
which, to a greater or less extent, has
grain markets as they cope with the29
1. Rising food grain production trends will create demand for
more and better marketing facilities, institutions,and infra-
structure.
2. These facilities will expand and improve but probably not as
fast as needed.
3. The relatively slow growth of market capacity relative to
production will be further aggravatedbyperiodic bumper
crops which will occur around a rising production trend.
4. The result will be periodic severe market gluts locally,
regionally, and nationally. They will be rendered more
acute because market facilities already will be over taxed.
5. Consumption, even with rapidly rising incomes and population,
can be expected to fluctuate less rapidly than output--especially
if internal price changes are controlled or modified.
6. To the extent that the previous observations hold true, pressures
will mount to move excess supplies into export channels. The
lack of adequate local storage and other market facilities can
cause this tendency to develop even when critical shortages are
occurring elsewhere in the country--this is clearly possible in
a large nation like India. (6) This tendency to export also
may be enhanced because (a) foreign exchange is required for
development, and (b) the existing transportation infrastructure
may be geared for primary product exports as a residue of an
earlier colonial era.7. These periodic
probably bring
30
exports, at least in the short run, will
lower than average prices on world markets
because of inherent uncertainties in location, volume, and
quality.
As a result of these developments, both commercial and confessional
imports from the developed world will dwindle. As previously mentioned,
these displaced shipments will tend to seek other destinations in a
shrinking or rather stagnant internationalmarket.
The great promise of the Green Revolution to help lift nations out
of poverty depends heavily upon the ability of internal markets, or
other allocation systems, to handle and distribute under great stress
both outputs and inputs. This paper emphasizes product markets, but
equally crucial are markets for skilled and unskilled labor, all kinds
of purchased inputs, land, credit, and management skills. The role of
these latter markets is being documented elsewhere. (1, 4, 14, 23, 25)
The Prospects
By combining the arguments made in the two previous sections, a
picture of the impact of the Green Revolution in the internationalmarket
place begins to emerge. The exact details of this picture are obviously
not clear, especially the further we look into the future. In the boiling
economic and political reality of today’s world, great change occurs
rapidly. However, the forces and trends that underpin these changes
move more slowly and regularly. Let us turn first to the short term
prospects, say between now and the middle or late 1970’s.31
Short Term
We have already asserted that bazring a major na?ural or military
catastrophe, a lower or only slowly-growingvolume of food grains,
particularly wheat, will move internatianqlly.,!&/This tendency will
be a general one but will center on the trade between developed exporters
and less-developed importers. This lower volume probably will be most
pronounced in non-ccnmnercial markets, but will also extend to commercial
trade. Generally lower world prices w*11 prevail, forced down by narrower
markets on the import side and supply pressure and export subsidies on
the export side. Short term economic and political forces may cause prices
to bounce up and down around this trend. In fact, a thinner world market
might easily display more price fluctuation than previously.
Self-sufficiencyamong less-developednaticms will result in mare
intense competition for existing commercial markets. The possible inter-
mittent exports from less-developednation+ will be added to displaced
commercial and confessional grain looking for markets. For a v?wiety of
reasons, including lower quality requirements shorter shipping distances,
and bilateral barter deals, regional trade in food grains among lpss-
developed nations can be expected to increase.
It may be that, because of less Ghan perfeqt substitution among
food grains, self-sufficiency in wheat will not also wipe out rice imports
or vice versa. But it is difficult to imaginp that$ in thq short run, ?—
some downward pressure on internal prices and imports of substitute grains
would not occur, unless offset by deliberate policy,32
Laok again at the world price (unit value) series for wheat and
rice, the premier f~od grains, figure 6. Notice that the wheat/rice
price ratio has increased recently even though both prices have fallen.
It @ possible that some less-developedwheat producers will undertake
a deliberate policy of exporting relatively higher priced wheat and
importing relatively cheaper rice.
pressure on rice but enhance it for
This would lessen the downward price
wheat. This kind of food grain
arbitrage illustrates
to and options within
ago. The extent that
that the Green Revolution has given nations ac~ess
fo~d grain markets not possible just a few years
operations like this are feasible to individual
nations also depends upon the range of
food grains in consumption. Much more
(9, 24)
substitution that exists among
should be known about this topic.
It is clearly possible that domestic and international feed grain
markets will become an importapt release valve for low priced, excess
food grains. This can be expected to exert downward pressure on the
generally bu~yant demand for corn, sorghum, and other coarse grains
during some years. Whether the short run impact of the Green Revolution
can be traced through to l~wer livestock and meat prices on world markets
is difficult to say. The economiq logic of the argument suggests it,
but it surely will not be easy to establish such a relationship empirically.
Taken together, these projected developments suggest that policy
makers in the developed grain exporting nat~ons will be driven to continued
and possibly increased levels of protection. Their objectives will be qo
insulate domestic markets from imports and to meet $ncreased competitionfor internationalsales.
minimum import prices and
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to control incoming supplies. Continued and possibly expanded reliance
on export subsidies, multiple pricing schemess and special credit arrange-
ments, will occur as exporters attempt to maintain and promote trade.
Thus, the links between world prices, domestic maqket prices, and farm
prices in the wealthier exporting nations could become weaker than ever.
Even if farm svpport prices are simply maintained or even lowered slightly,
larger decreases in internationalprice levels will mean that relative
levels of protection will have increased.
As less-developednations eliminate regular reliance on food aid
imports, this component of the international grain trade will tend to
shrink. As it shrinks, it may also become highly volatile and follow
the unpredictable fluctuations in weather and natural calamities. One
year food aid needs may be negligible. The next year, drought, floods,
or earthquakes could combine to send food aid needs soaring to unprecedented
levels. Multinational programs going beyond current agreements will be
needed to spread the costs of erratic food aid requirements.
It seems likely that production controls will be continued in some
form or another in the United States, Canada, and Australia. If the U,S.
experience is a guide, more expensive programs to hold acreage out of
food grains or divert it to other uses will meet strong resistance from
consumers, tax-payers, and fiscal agencies within governments. The potential
entry of the United Kingdom into the EEC may take some pressure off of the
food grain surplus problem inside the expanded community, but it will add
to the problem of narrowing markets faced by outsiders.34
That these prespures for heightened protection should be developing
at the same time that significant movements toward preferential agreements
favoring less-developednations are occurring is indped ironic. Despite
political rhetoric and speeches by government officials idealizing trade
liberalization,potential preferential agreements involving members of
UNCTAD, GATT, OECD$ EEC, and EFTA probably will involve exclusions on
many agricultural products, particularly food grains.
Longer-Term
Speculation on longer-term




us assume that in the less-
developed nations of Asia (1) the fruits of the Green Revolution, one way
or another, are distributed fairly widely among people in 1980 and beyond,
(2) population growth is not stimulated, and (3) per capita incomes continue
to grow.
In this setting, the rather pessimistic outlook for the 1970’s gives
way to some optimism. All this, of course, hinges upon widely distributed
growth in per capita incomes. Without it, the long term outlook remains
rather bleak for food grain markets and less optimistic than now for feed
grains. As per capita incomes grow, the demand for food grains and feed
13/ Since the demand for livestock products, hence feed grains will grow.a
grains, probably will respond more strong to income growth, productive
resources in the less-developednations can be diverted into feed productions
livestock production, and other activities. With growing incomes and more
opportunities for agricultural diversification, the self-sufficiency objec-
tives with respect to food grain probably will weaken.35
The developed nations still will
in food grains, especially those with
have nagging excess capacity prob~ems
strong protective policies in pl~ce.
The longer term developments suggested in the previous paragraph for less-
developed nations also will assist and stimulate the movement of resources
into feed grains, high protein feeds, and livestock production in the
developed nations. Export opportunities will remain and grow, slpwly
perhaps, for high protein hard bread wheats. Much of the adjustment burden
will fall upon the producers of soft wheats and other lower quality food
grains all over the world.
Policy Inmlications
Given political realities, is difficult to suggest specifi~ policies
that the developed nations reasonably might be expected to adopt in deal-
ing with the issues raised in this paper. The governments of wealthier
nations wZ1l be torn between policies to foster and promote the promise
of the Green Revolution on one hand and the claims of their own farmers
and grain dealers for price and income protection on the other. Limited
funds available for foreign aid and agricultural support will preclude
massive programs in either direction.
Perhaps the major policy suggestion that emerges is for the developed
nations to devote more and more of their limited foreign aid and technical
assistance to the establishment of stronger more flexible markets and
market institutions in nations experiencing~jor grain production advances.
This applies to markets for products and for the critical new inputs.
Smoothly operating markets and allocative institutionswill be able to36
distribute increased volumes more efficiently over time, over space, and
among alternative outlets. Success in this policy direction will have
the dual advantage of (1) helping to secure the benefits of the Green
Revolution for both farm and non-farm
and (2) helping to avoid intermittent
caused by excess supplies surging out
local markets cannot handle them.
At home, the most feasible short
people in the less-developednatipns,
disturbances in internationalmarkets
of less-developed
run policy of the
nations beqause
developed nations
is probably to continue to restrain production of food grains, especially





Equity and fairness suggest that production restraint is
of any developed nation which chooses to operate a compre-
or income support scheme for its domestic wheat farmers.
run, additional movement of resources out of food grains
and into other activities, both agricultural and non-agricultural, should
be a prime policy objective of the developed nations, difficult as this
may be.
Consider one final suggestion on the food grain policy of developed
nations. As less-developednations approach self-sufficiency,their non-
commercial or food aid requirements will dwindle. Facing shrinking commercial
markets, the temptation will be strong for nations like the United States,
Canada, and the EEC to press these non-commercial supplies onto other poor
nations where the Green Revolution has yet to begin. These other nations
are concentrated in Africa and Latin America. Where food deficits @nd
foreign exchange shortages are critical, there are surely legitimateopportunist ies
the objective
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for food aid preferably on a multilateral basis. But if
of surplus disposal dominates and highly attractive terms
of exchange are offered, then the progress of agricultural development
may be further impeded in those nations where it will be most critical
in the coming years. This can occur if prices of food grains are held
at very low levels with confessional imports and if the easy availability
of these imports divert the attention of development officials away from
the difficult questions of agricultural progress.
Some might argue that the international costs and consequences of
the Green Revolution are falling largely and inequitably upon the world’s
major grain producing and trading nations. Generally speaking, they are
correct. But these are costs which the developed nations are well advised
to pay in order to foster agricultural and human development among the
less fortunate occupants of this globe.38
FOOTNOTES
~/ It is, of course, difficult to be precise about the distinction
between developed and less-developednations. For this paper, the
developed nations will be to the wealthy countries of Western
Europe, Canada, Japan, Australia, and the United States. The less-
developed nations will be non-communist countries in Asia, Latin
America, and Africa. When referred to, communist countries will
include the USSR, its associated nations in Eastern Europe, Cuba,
People’s Republic of China (Mainland China), Mongolia and the
communist portions of Korea and Vietnam.
~/ The terms European Economic Community (EEC) and European Community
are used interchangeablyin this paper to designate the six-nation
common market formed by Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of
Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. Since the member
nations now follow a common agricultural policy, we can view the
Ilnationlf for most purposes. community as a single The impending
accession of the United Kingdom to membership in the community
does not appreciably alter the thrust of the arguments made in this
paper.
~/ Argentina, the other major traditionalwheat exporter, is not con-
sidered explicitly in this discussion. Her stage of economic
development and policy problems are distinctly different than most
other temperate zone grain exporters.39
Descriptions of these policies and programs are given in (2, 5, 11,
15, 19, 21, 26, 29, 31).
The entry of the United Kingdom into the European Community will
probably involve, at least at the beginning, the extension of the
EEC Common Agricultural Policy to British Agriculture. Consequently,
overall self-sufficiencywithin the enlarged community probably will
remain high at the expense of previous exporters to the United Kingdom.
The data used in this section were drawn from offical tabulations
by the Food and
U.S. Department
33, 34) A good
data is a paper
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the
of Agriculture, and other agencies. (10, 13, 30, 32
recent counEry-by-country summary of the relevant
by Haseyama in (l). See also (12, 16, 18, 35).
No specific discussion is included here on the InternationalWheat
Agreements which existed until 1967, the International Grains Arrange-
ment of 1967-70, or the recently-negotiated InternationalWheat
Agreement of 1971-73. It is assumed here that these agreements,
especially the 1967-70 version, had rather little impact on the
conduct and patterns of world trade.
The term LIFT is a wry acronym indicating “Lower Inventory for
Tomorrow”.
The recent data on rice prices in internationalmarkets reflect
substantial weakness and excess supplies. This tends to amplify
the downward price pressure in world wheat markets, and vice versa. .—40
~/ Economists and others have identified numerous other critical
sources of stress linked to the progress of the Green Revolution.
These include differential impacts on employment, income distribution,
land ownership and control, and political stability.
11/ A related argument along these lines could be developed focusing on .
markets for purchased inputs like fertilizer, disease and pest control
products and services, machinery, tools, and production credit.
12/ Someplace in a paper like this — , attention should be drawn to the
argument that, like many other agricultural products, wheat is not
homogeneous. Many distinct qualities exist. Demand for high protein
hard wheats is fairly strong and has rather favorable prospects.
Demand for lower protein soft wheats is weaker and has poorer prospects.
Unfortunately, government price policy in some nations, particularly
the United States, has not distinguished sufficiently among qualities.
Consequently, excessive production of the soft wheats has occurred
and comprises much of the surplus problem.
13/ Most empirical estimates suggest that income elasticities for grains, —
including food grains, are still quite high in the less-developed
world, even when numerous problems of measurement are considered.
For example, see (22).41
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